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Abstract. Two major lines of argument support the notion that Hildegard 
of Bingen’s metaphysics is peculiarly gynocentric. Contra the standard 
commentary on her work, the focus is not on the notion of viriditas; rather, 
the first line of argument presents a  specific delineation of her ontology, 
demonstrating that it is a graded hierarchy of beings, many of which present 
feminine aspects of the divine, and all of which establish the metaphysical 
notion of interpenetrability. The second line of argument specifically contrasts 
her thought to that of Aquinas and Meister Eckhart, noting areas of similarity 
and difference. It is concluded that the visionary origins of Hildegard’s work 
may have to some extent precluded our understanding of it, and that her work 
merits consideration not only philosophically and theologically but from the 
standpoint of its early presentation of a gynocentric worldview.
Hildegard of Bingen possesses an  odd place in the current project of 
resurrecting the work of women philosophers. Unlike other women 
thinkers who have traditionally been accorded at least some small 
place in the pantheon  – Hypatia, Anne Conway, Damaris Cudworth 
Masham  – Hildegard has historically been sufficiently well-known so 
that the contention that she was lost does not stand up. On the other 
hand, precisely because Hildegard already has a  place, at least in 
theological thinking,1 there is enough commentary on her work that the 
feminist scholar who chooses Hildegard as a subject may find herself in 
the somewhat unusual position, vis-a-vis a woman philosopher, of going 
against the grain.
Linda Lopez McAlister, in her introduction to a  recent work on 
women in philosophy, remarked that Hildegard was the only woman 
1 The main work is Hildegardis Scivias, Adelgundis Fuhrkotter, ed., Corpus 
Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis, Vol. LXIII (Turnhaut: Pontificat, l978). Due to 
the renascence of interest in mystical thinkers, Hildegard’s work is now widely cited.
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thinker categorizable as a philosopher of whose existence she had been 
aware as a student.2 Matthew Fox has done extensive work on Hildegard, 
and she is widely perceived as standing in the same mystical tradition as 
Meister Eckhart.3 But Hildegard’s visions are informative for us, I shall 
argue, in a number of ways. Fox, Newman and others have argued that 
Hildegard brings a  peculiarly female dimension to her thinking.4 The 
concept of viriditas, for example, seems consonant with an ecologically-
oriented wholeness, and strikes a chord with regard to current work by 
feminist theorists on deep ecology and ecofeminism.5 The challenge, 
I  believe, is to provide an  account of Hildegard’s ontology which is 
specific enough to achieve philosophical adequacy and simultaneously 
sufficiently developed from a feminist point of view to be able to sustain 
the assertion that portions of Hildegard’s work are gynocentric.
Both Conway and Masham have received critiques which focus on 
their construction of ontologies or metaphysical viewpoints that might be 
deemed to be feminist.6 Hildegard’s work requires a similar explication. 
In this paper I shall be concerned to develop her ontology in such a way 
that delineation of its mystical origins helps us understand the nature 
of its gynocentrism. I shall first be concerned with some particulars of 
Hildegard’s metaphysics.
I.
An  area of difficulty with presentation of Hildegard’s ontology is 
immediately apparent upon reading a work like the Scivias, for example, 
2 Linda Lopez McAlister, ‘Some Remarks on Exploring the History of Women in 
Philosophy’, in Hypatia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring l989), 1.
3 See, for example, Matthew Fox, Illuminations of Hildegard of Bingen (Santa Fe, NM: 
Bear & Co., l985). Fox specifically makes the comparison with Eckhart on pp. 16-l7; 
Fox and Bruce Hozeski (eds.) composed an English edition of Scivias through Bear & 
Co., l986.
4 Helen John, ‘Hildegard of Bingen’, unpublished ms. (Trinity College, Washington, 
DC, l990).
5 See Hypatia, Vol. 6, No. l (l99l): this special issue contains approximately a dozen 
articles on ecofeminism.
6 See the relevant articles from Hypatia, op.  cit.; Jane Duran, ‘Anne Viscountess 
Conway: A  Seventeenth Century Rationalist’, pp.  64-79, and Lois Frankel, ‘Damaris 
Cudworth Masham: A  Seventeenth Century Rationalist Philosopher’, pp.  80-90. With 
regard to Conway’s work, a superbly edited version is available: Anne Conway, Principles 
of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, Peter Loptson, ed. (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, l982).
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even in its English excerpts and translations. The problem is that this 
work (and many others attributed to Hildegard) is the product of a series 
of visions, and the visionary influence presents us with assertions 
which, taken as a  whole, are either inconsistent or incoherent.7 Even 
a commentator like Fox, who wishes to employ Hildegard’s visions for 
his new theology, presents us with brief excerpts from Scivias, the letters 
and De Operatione Dei which give seemingly contradictory accounts of 
the structure of the universe.8 Nevertheless, some points of comparison 
seem clear, once the nature of the visions becomes apparent.
Hildegard presents us with a dualistic metaphysics, but with a meta-
physical apparatus that allows for complex ontological relationships 
between various gradations of being. Just as Anne Conway posited 
a being midway between God and humankind (Conway refers to this 
being as ‘Adam Kadmon’, following cabbalistic tradition),9 Hildegard 
seems to hold an ontological view which allows for the triune deity, the 
standard sorts of Christian spiritual entities such as angels, and then 
intermediate entities, such as the Virtues, which are above human and 
animalkind in the ontological hierarchy but which are still essentially 
spiritual entities. In various of Hildegard’s visions these beings are 
personified as animals or entities with more human features but still 
metaphysically separate from the lower realm of existence. This same 
ontological separation seems also to come out of some of Hildegard’s 
visions with regard to manifestations of the Trinity. Uhlein’s translation 
of parts of De Operatione describes one vision as
... Love appearing in a human form, the Love of our Heavenly Father ... 
Love – in the power of the everlasting Godhead, full of exquisite beauty, 
marvellous in its mysterious gifts.10
In other words, Hildegard’s visions allowed her to create epicycles 
on her ontology, as it were, which show a  degree of union and 
interpenetration between the spiritual and material worlds which would 
be rare even for a  visionary Christian. It is this aspect of Hildegard’s 
7 An interesting contrast is that between the cosmic structure given in Scivias (Latin 
ed., op. cit.), p. 42 and Welt und Mensch (German translation of Hildegard’s De Operatione 
Dei) (Salzburg, l965), p. 35.
8 Fox makes this comparison, which is taken from the primary sources referred to in 
the previous fn., on pp. 35 and 39 of Illuminations.
9 Duran, ‘Conway’, p. 66.
10 Gabriele Uhein, Meditations with Hildegard of Bingen (Santa Fe, NM: Bear & Co., 
l982), pp. 40, 37.
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work which has usually been labelled ‘feminist’ by the commentators, 
and it ties into the other aspect of her work that has received extensive 
attention, the notion of viriditas. This notion of a life-force – this time 
a manifestation of the spirit through that which is material – is, according 
to Fox, ‘... God’s freshness that humans receive in their spiritual and 
physical [capacities]’.11 Thus Hildegard sees creation as having the 
capacity to manifest physically that which is spiritual. Although this 
does not give her any unusual sort of monistic view (which we find, for 
example, in some of the philosophers of the early modern period), it 
apparently yields for her a view which allows the spiritual and material 
to intermingle, even if the nature of the intermingling is not clear.12 
The notion of a dualism which allows for penetration or admixture is 
a  metaphysically sophisticated concept, preceding occasionalist and 
other Cartesian notions, and allowing for the gradations of spirituality 
that I  have mentioned above. Uhlein, working from De Operatione, 
translates Hildegard as writing:
O  Holy Spirit, you are the mighty way in which everything that is in 
the heavens, on the earth, and under the earth, is penetrated with 
connectedness, penetrated with relatedness.13
The contention that viriditas or a  similar manifestation of this 
commingling is peculiarly gynocentric is drawn out further by 
Newman, who in her commentary focuses on the extent to which some 
of the personifications of the Virtues mentioned earlier are also highly 
feminized figures. As Newman notes, this was characteristic of certain 
strands of medieval thought, but Hildegard perhaps utilized these 
personified entities in new ways. Illumination Six in Fox’s collection 
of excerpts, largely from the Scivias, focuses on the vision that sees the 
universe as an organic part of the deity; the Virtues, Newman notes, are 
personae such that ‘... wherever [they] appear, we will find the Platonizing 
cosmology that captivates 12th century thinkers: the divine ideas, eternal 
in the mind of God and bodied forth in creatures; ...’14
Thus a cursory impression of Hildegard of Bingen’s ontology is that it 
is a graded dualism which allows for some interaction between spirit and 
11 Fox, Illuminations, p. 32.
12 Again, Conway seems to hold such a monism.
13 Uhlein, Meditations, p. 4l.
14 Barbara Newman, Sister of Wisdom: St. Hildegard’s Theology of the Feminine 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, l987), p. 44.
159HILDEGARD OF BINGEN: A FEMINIST ONTOLOGY
matter. The notions of connectedness and relatedness, which we would 
clearly deem gynocentric and which fly in the face of the more atomistic 
thinking of others from the same period,15 seem even more powerful 
when we remember that Hildegard wrote a  number of empirically-
based pieces, and that at least one, her medical work, does not lay 
claim to being of visionary origin. In the next section a development of 
Hildegard’s more overtly poetic and musical work will follow, coupled 
with an analysis of what can be gleaned from her metaphysics once these 
more literary pieces are examined.
II.
Hozeski’s analysis of Hildegard’s morality play, Ordo Virtutum, is of great 
help in a further refinement of her notions of commitment in terms of 
entities. The strong counter that could be made to any attempt to come to 
grips with her hierarchy is that the results of such an account, as mentioned 
above, are metaphorical at best and unstable – or unintended – at worst, 
but a  look at Virtutum seems to bear out some of the niceties of her 
ontology.
Throughout Scivias, certain entities recur: the Virtutum repeats this 
theme. Although Hozeski’s main concern is to establish Hildegard as 
chronologically prior to the canonically-verified liturgical play tradition, 
his analysis of the structure of the personae is revealing.
The ‘Ordo’ of the Virtues begins with a list of ‘Personae’. The first of the 
‘Personae’ are the Patriarchs and Prophets, followed by the Souls and by 
Humility, a  Queen. There are three Choruses. The first consists of six 
members: Knowledge of God, Charity, Hope, Chastity, Heavenly Love 
and Discretion. The second Chorus has five members: Faith, Contempt 
of the World, Discipline, Patience and Modesty. The third also has five: 
Fear of God, Obedience, Innocence, Mercy and Victory. The Devil is 
listed separately and finally in the ‘Personae’.16
This listing of the Virtues would not be so striking were it not 
consonant with a  good deal of the Scivias, and were the Virtues not 
placed on a  par, metaphysically, with several other entities. Hozeski 
15 Fox, for one, specifically compares her to Aquinas in this regard.
16 Bruce W. Hozeski, ‘Hildegard of Bingen’s Ordo Virtutum: the Earliest Discovered 
Liturgical Morality Play’, in American Benedictine Review, Vol. 26, No. 3 (September 
l975), 251-259. (This citation p. 252)
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notes, for example, that ‘... a  ... Soul  ... passes through  ... the conquest 
of the Devil by the coming of Christ with His virtues ...’;17 several of the 
scenes have the Soul in conversation with the individual Virtues, the 
Devil and so forth. Although Hozeski mentions Hildegard’s fondness 
for certain kinds of visual images, which are also found throughout the 
Scivias, her poetry and some musical works, the visual images are only 
very generally related to each other, and vary in metaphorical intensity. 
He notes, for example, that the finale of Virtutum has ‘... images of love, 
of darkness and brightness, death and growth ... with those of dryness 
and water, and fruitful flowers, plants and trees’.18 These images are 
consistent with many of the vaguer results of the Scivias, as found in the 
illustrations (and as treated by Fox) – more direct constructions seem 
to figure in any activity involving notions of individual salvation or the 
activity of the soul.19
Barbara Grant, writing in Signs, seems to come to a similar conclusion 
about the importance of a  sort of ontological intermediary (or set of 
intermediaries) for Hildegard. Noting the Gnostic origins of some of 
what Hildegard appeared to use as subject matter, both for the Virtutum 
and her Symphonia, Grant writes:
Wisdom makes regular appearances in Hildegard’s visions and speaks 
as the Wisdom of God. We have recently learned a great deal about the 
Sophia-Sapientia figure from the recovery in this century of Gnostic 
documents  ... The consensus is that the female counter-part of the 
godhead in Gnosticism is the Wisdom of Judaism ... she both precedes 
and is instrumental in the creation of the world .... [S]he has existed from 
eternity, and ... she assisted and harmonized the creation of the various 
parts of the physical universe.20
Song 59, as translated by Grant, is specifically addressed to Wisdom 
and provides us with a precise visual interpretation of her – although 
this is far from unusual for a  vision-driven work, the consistency of 
Hildegard’s assertions on this score merits some degree of confidence.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 259.
19 Hozeski (p. 256) also cites Hardison as noting that the liturgical plays of the type 
created by Hildegard were constrained by a  ‘sacramental psychology’. (Hozeski citing 
O.B. Hardison, Christian Rite and Christian Drama in the Middle Ages (Baltimore: n.p., 
l965), p. 289).
20 Barbara L. Grant, ‘Five Liturgical Songs by Hildegard von Bingen (l098-ll79)’, in 
Signs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring l980), 557-567. (This citation pp. 56l-562.)
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Given the nature of Hildegard’s mysticism and the concomitant 
philosophical ramifications, the feminist theorist who wishes to pursue 
the importance of notions such as connectedness and penetration for 
Hildegard’s work must make some comparisons with other metaphysical 
commitments of the time. Fox wants to make an easy comparison with 
Aquinas; although this can be done, it is not always to the point since it 
is clear that the origins of Aquinas’s conceptualizations are vastly more 
empirical. The more obvious point of comparison is Meister Eckhart. 
Fox does himself make this comparison, and this contrast – along with 
some of the more standard Aristotelian material from Aquinas and 
others – provides a base from which we may expand on the significance 
of Hildegard’s gynocentrism.
III.
The commentators on Hildegard seem to differ in precisely what it is that 
makes her work of philosophical importance. That is, if we accept the 
fact that Hildegard, as a visionary, is working from a different conceptual 
standpoint than many even of the lesser-known medieval thinkers, it 
must be inquired precisely what it is about Hildegard’s work that makes 
it philosophical and comparable to other philosophical  – rather than, 
say, poetic – work of the period.
Brunn and Epiney-Burgard answer this question implicitly by arguing 
that Hildegard’s work is ‘didactic’. They note that:
In general, Hildegard’s visions have been considered didactic rather than 
ecstatic; that is to say, through them, she transmitted her knowledge in 
allegorical form. Her visions are not hallucinations, even when received 
in wakefulness, but they allow her to penetrate ‘with the eyes and ears of 
the inner man’ into the realm of the ‘spiritual senses’, where what one sees 
and hears is received in a supranatural light, ‘shadow of the Living Light’, 
and sometimes, very exceptionally, she penetrates that light itself.21
In other words, one might want to make the case for the elucidation 
of Hildegard’s metaphysics and even a  nascent epistemology  – largely 
on the basis of what the goal of the visionary presentation is. We may 
think of Hildegard herself as not only motivated toward but actually 
21 Emily Zun Brunn and Georgette Epiney-Burgard, Women Mystics in Medieval 
Europe (New York: Paragon House, l989), pp. 8-9.
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enthusiastic about the presentation of her metaphysics; this is presumably 
what Brunn and Epiney-Burgard mean when they say that here visions 
are ‘... not hallucinations’.
Given the foregoing (a view which is, of course, consonant with Fox’s, 
as well as Hozeski’s), one might be surprised to find that the intersections 
between Hildegard’s work and those of other medieval philosophers are 
rather more obvious than might initially be thought. Aquinas’s pedantic 
and semi-Aristotelian style is in direct contrast, of course, but not all 
of the philosophical points fail to be congruent. Consider the following 
passage from Aquinas’ ‘On the Composition of Essence and Existence in 
Created Substances’, from De ente et essentia:
Hence there is no composition of matter and form of any kind in the 
soul or an intelligence. On this score, then, essence cannot be said to be 
in them as it is in corporeal substances. But composition of form and 
existence is there ... Now whatever pertains to anything is either caused 
by the principles of its nature, as man’s ability to laugh, or it stems from 
some extrinsic principle, as the sun’s luminosity in the atmosphere  ... 
Therefore everything whose existence is something other than its nature 
must derive its existence from another.22
The preceding passage is exemplary because it contains less of the type 
of distinction frequently occurring in Aquinas and seldom occurring in 
Hildegard – that between primary and secondary substances, accidents 
and so forth. Rather, the language lends itself to the characterization 
of the deity which occurs throughout Hildegard’s works, and which is 
cited here in the excision from Uhlein’s translation of De Operatione 
and Newman’s commentary on Hildegard’s cosmology: the deity as the 
source of all things, and form as influencing both the individual soul and 
(on Hildegard’s view), the ‘divine ideas’, or Virtues.
Hildegard’s notion that an examination of creation paves the way for 
further knowledge of the deity is also found in, for example, the work of 
Peter Lombard: as Wippel and Wolter have it, an intriguing passage in 
Lombard’s Libri Sententiarum reads:
... it has been shown here just how some likeness at least of the Trinity 
is found in creatures. Without interior revelation or a revelation of this 
22 Thomas Aquinas, originally from De ente et essentia, Roland-Gosselin, ed. (Paris: 
J. Vrin, l948); translated by A.B. Wolter and excerpted in Medieval Philosophy: From St. 
Augustine to Nicholas of Cusa, John F. Wippel and Allan B. Wolter, eds. (New York: Free 
Press, l969), pp. 330-332.
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doctrine, however, adequate knowledge of the Trinity neither was nor 
can be obtained from a contemplation of creatures. That is why ancient 
philosophers could only see the Trinitarian truth in a haze, as it were, 
and from afar .... Nevertheless, our belief in what we cannot see is helped 
by means of the things that were made.23
That there should be at least some strong connection between the 
metaphysics which can be gleaned from Hildegard’s visions and other 
medieval ontologies should not be so surprising when one remembers 
that, historically, the eleventh century is regarded as a watershed in the 
rise of Western culture. Palmer, whose European history is more or less 
a  benchmark for generations of students, remarks that ‘... such a  time 
[a  time of dynamic change] has been the last century  ... Such a  time, 
also, began in Europe in the eleventh century.’24 He also reminds us of 
the facts of the early years of Hildegard’s life: she was born around the 
time of the election of Gregory VII (Hildebrand), a ‘dynamic and strong-
willed’ reformer. Brunn and Epiney-Burgard are at pains to emphasize 
Hildegard’s interest in the autonomy of her order; surely some of the 
impetus for her zeal in trying to spread her cosmology and its corollaries 
came from the historical events which provided the context and backdrop 
for Churchly innovation.25
IV.
Perhaps the thinker with whom Hildegard bears the strongest 
comparison is Meister Eckhart. Fox makes this comparison explicitly;26 
for our purposes the more important point is that the Meister is regarded 
as standing squarely within the mystical tradition, and yet a  number 
of philosophical positions are freely attributed to him and recur in 
extended commentary. The desire to characterize Meister Eckhart as 
a philosopher does not appear to stem solely from his use of the more 
Aristotelian and Thomistic terminology which, of course, was subsequent 
(in its extensive usage) to Hildegard’s time – rather, Meister Eckhart is, 
23 Peter Lombard, Libri IV Sententiarum (Collegii S. Bonaventurae, l916), tom. I, 30-
33, excerpted in
 Wippel and Wolter, op. cit., and translated by Wolter, p. 208.
24 R. R. Palmer, A History of the Modern World (New York: Knopf, l964), p. 22.
25 Brunn and Epiney-Burgard, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
26 Cf. fn. 3.
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according to McGinn, a mystic without specifically being a visionary.27 
In other words, it appears that the virtue that Meister Eckhart possesses 
is that he engages in speculative ratiocination about some of the same 
problems that Hildegard pursued through ecstatic and visionary means. 
What is remarkable, however, is that again we find areas of consonance 
between the two thinkers. Meister Eckhart writes that the ‘... soul ... has 
a drop of understanding, a little spark, a little sprout ...’, and that it ‘... has 
powers which work in the body’.28 In a more extended commentary in 
Sermon 9 (one of his works in German, more accessible than several 
other of his commentaries), he explains:
... God is something that of necessity must be above being. Whatever 
has being, time or place does not touch God. He is above it. God is in all 
creatures, insofar as they have being, and yet he is above them. That same 
thing that he is in all creatures is exactly what he is above them. Whatever 
is one in many things must of necessity be above them. Some masters 
maintain that the soul is only in the heart. This is not so, and learned 
masters have gone astray here. The soul is complete and undivided at 
the same time in the foot and in the eye and in every part of the body.29
In his gloss on this part of the Sermon, Bernard McGinn notes the 
extent to which Eckhart seems to rely on what Aquinas would refer to as 
the via negationis, that is positing what God is not;30 he also notes that 
Eckhart makes use of the fact that ‘... the conceptual distinction between 
substance and relation is legitimate in thinking about God as three-who-
are-one, but is not in any way applicable to the hidden Godhead’.31 In any 
case, for our purposes the noteworthy point is the obvious comparison 
between Hildegard and Meister Eckhart: Hildegard cites the ‘mysterious 
gifts’ of the Godhead (in Uhlein’s translation of De Operatione, previously 
excised), and notes the Godhead’s ‘connectedness’ to all living beings. 
Meister Eckhart notes that God is ‘... in all creatures, insofar as they have 
being ...’ and goes on to make an analogy between the way in which God 
is ‘in’ things of the material world, and the way in which the soul is in the 
body. The soul, he asserts, is even in the foot.
27 Bernard McGinn, Teacher and Preacher (New York: Paulist Press, l986), p. 14.
28 Sermon 9 (‘Quasi stella ...’), in McGinn, op. cit., p. 257.
29 Ibid., p. 256.
30 Ibid., p. 25.
31 Ibid., p. 20.
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Thus Hildegard seems to receive, visionarily, the same sort of 
knowledge  – knowledge which, as Newman emphasizes, she wants to 
impart to others – that Eckhart receives largely through contemplation. 
It seems appropriate to assert that we would want to label both of these 
theorists philosophers.
V.
If we can find intersections between the interests and assertions of 
Hildegard and those of other, male, philosophers of the medieval 
period – as we have done above – it might be pertinent to ask in what her 
gynocentrism consists. Fox, Newman and Hozeski all seem to agree that 
there is a particularly strong gyncentred style to Hildegard’s work, even if 
there is some slight disagreement about the manner in which it presents 
itself.32 The concept of viriditas alone is not enough to enable us to make 
this assertion: it is structurally similar to many of the statements Meister 
Eckhart makes about the immanence of the divine nature. Nor can we 
posit the mystical or even visionary modes of Hildegard’s epistemology 
as the primary factors here; clearly, these are elements of knowledge 
reception which are quite common among the medieval thinkers of 
a number of strands of the Christian tradition.
What strikes one preliminarily about Hildegard’s thought is the 
nature of her ontology and the gradedness of its construction. Recent 
work on feminist epistemology in the analytic tradition has posited the 
‘dialectical’ and ‘connected’ nature of female styles of coming-to-believe 
as paramount; androcentric styles have frequently been characterized 
as normative, and detached and distanced from the purported objects 
of knowledge. In the paradigmatic case, we can agree with Bordo, for 
example, that Descartes’ style is peculiarly androcentric because the 
desire to pull oneself away from the objects of the senses and to categorize 
over them in such a  way as to achieve freedom from error seems to 
recapitulate, according to psychoanalytic theory, certain elements of 
male personality formation.33
Hildegard’s hierarchy of being, like Anne Conway’s several hundred 
years later (although Conway, of course, employs much more standard 
32 Cf. the title of Newman’s work on Hildegard, fn. 14.
33 Susan Bordo, The Flight to Objectivity (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, l987). There is 
an  extended discussion in this work of object relations theory and its relationship to 
an analysis of Descartes’ work.
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philosophical terminology, including the standard rationalist constructs 
of her time), demonstrates an intermingling of gradations throughout its 
structure. Although we are tempted to label Hildegard a standard dualist, 
insofar as Christian thought requires this, Hildegard, like Eckhart, 
precedes to some extent the Spinozan ‘all things that are are in God’ by 
establishing her ontology as permeated by the divine. In addition, the 
strong place of the Virtues – Knowledge of God, or the traditional Sophia 
figure of the Gnostic tradition being chief among them – ensures a sort 
of concern for interaction of the principles of masculine and feminine 
which is almost more characteristic of thinkers outside the Christian 
heritage.
Several of the commentators report Hildegard’s own awareness of her 
status as a female, and this fact seems in itself significant, for example, to 
Newman who notes:
[Her] texts ... interwoven as they are with references to her own simplicity, 
frailty, and femininity, insist on her authority with a defiance proportional 
to her fear that her books would indeed be concealed, altered, abridged, 
ridiculed, or ignored. In her Vita she tells how, when she was founding 
her new monastery at the Rupertsberg, many people asked ‘why so many 
mysteries should be revealed to a foolish and uneducated woman, when 
there are many powerful and learned men’, and some wondered whether 
she had been seduced by evil spirits.34
Somewhat heterodoxically, I would like to reiterate that the salient 
points here are neither Hildegard’s status as female, nor her awareness 
of it. Rather, Hildegard’s metaphysics is peculiarly gynocentric, even 
given the mystical epistemic base upon which it relies. Although she 
does not and cannot fashion the sorts of questions that would later be 
puzzling for dualists with regard to the interaction of two substances, 
she, like Conway at a  later point, avoids these questions by positing 
interpenetration as primitive and by propounding a sort of metaphysical 
view of the union of the material and the divine which is, in its own 
way, a kind of precursor of interactive monism. Rupert of Deutz, a male 
mystic writer of the same period, shares with Hildegard the notion of 
visionary experience as a form of knowledge acquisition, but as Newman 
notes, ‘His visions adorn and authenticate his writings, but they do not 
34 Barbara Newman, ‘Hildegard of Bingen: Visions and Validation’, in Church History, 
Vol. 54, No. 2 (June l985), l63-l75. This citation is from p. l7l.
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determine the whole, and the inspiration he avows is of a  far more 
general and less challenging sort than hers.’35 Augustine, like Hildegard, 
compares the corporeal light and the spiritual light, but for Augustine, 
‘... such light-speculation ... is envisaged [as] a mystical ascent involving 
brief moments of ecstasy rather than a continuous illumination such as 
Hildegard’s.’36
Hildegard, like the later Conway and Masham, has developed 
a gynocentric philosophy based on a metaphysics and epistemology that 
reject the divorce and detachment so common to male theorists. Although 
the commentary on her work, much of it done within the framework of 
Church scholarship, has tended to emphasize her status as a visionary 
and a woman, my claim has been that neither of these facts fully explains 
the strength of Hildegard’s work. Her ontological constructs, with the 
linkages between levels of being and the divine intercession of female or 
feminine figures, are themselves the most striking points of her theology. 
Hildegard, like Meister Eckhart, is a medieval mystic whose work speaks 
to us today. Unlike Meister Eckhart, she presents us with a gynocentric 
worldview that may serve as an antidote to our contemporary ills.
35 Ibid., p. l73.
36 Ibid., p. 168.
